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The Uniform Commercial Code determines the content of most commercial law
default rules by incorporating common merchant practices. The success of this in-
corporation strategy depends on the likely efficiency of evolved commercial prac-
tices. In this Article, I use the best available theory of cultural evolution to analyze
how and why commercial practices evolve. This analysis confirms that the incorpo-
ration strategy is far superior to a system in which lawmakers rely predominantly
on individual analysis and experimentation to design commercial law. But the anal-
ysis also demonstrates that common commercial practices, and the laws incorporat-
ing them, are unlikely to be optimal, in the sense that they cannot be improved at
any cost. There is good reason, then, to explore supplemental strategies for enhanc-
ing the efficiency of individual commercial practices on a selected basis. The viabil-
ity of such strategies will depend on their costs and likely success in improving on
commercial practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
ARTICLE 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code virtually ended the debate
over how contract default rules should be made. In designing Article 2, Karl
Llewellyn created a sales law that incorporates the norms instinct in com-
mon commercial practice.' The substantive content of the vast bulk of sales
law is therefore provided by giving legal effect to the ordinary practices of
merchants, without subjecting these practices to critical scrutiny. Llewel-
* I am grateful for very helpful comments from Barry Adler, Ian Ayres, Lisa Bernstein,
Robert Boyd, Clayton Gillette, Michael Klausner, Lewis Kornhauser, Saul Levmore, Eric
Posner, Alan Schwartz, Robert Scott, David Skeel, Steven Walt, and participants in the Legal
Theory Workshops at the Georgetown University Law Center and University of Virginia Law
School.
The term "norm" throughout this article is used to refer to a "statistical norm" or com-
mon pattern of commercial behavior, rather than a "moral norm" that purports to distinguish
between good and bad behavior. Article 2 incorporates the statistical norms of commercial
practice into law through its directive to interpret the substantive meaning of most of its core
terms by adverting to usage of trade. See UCC §§ 1-201 and 1-205(4).
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lyn's "incorporation strategy" 2 thus relieves lawmakers of the analytical
and experimental burdens they might otherwise bear in attempting to design
the most efficient sales law possible. It may be possible, however, for law-
makers to design commercial laws that are more efficient than those deter-
mined by the incorporation strategy. Whether they can depends on the effi-
ciency of evolved commercial practices. Unfortunately, few have gone
beyond the mere invocation of a market or evolutionary metaphor to assess
their likely efficiency.3 In this article, I use the best available theory of cul-
tural evolution to provide an analysis of how and why commercial norms
evolve. That analysis reveals that commercial norms will develop only if
they provide merchants with a more cost-effective method of adopting com-
mercial practices on average than the alternative of each merchant starting
from scratch. Given the high costs of developing a complete set of commer-
cial practices solely on the basis of individual experimentation, commercial
norms could develop even if the practices they prescribe were on average
less efficient than practices developed by individual merchant experimenta-
tion. The chief advantage of relying on commercial norms, instead of in-
dividual experimentation, is not that the practices they prescribe are neces-
sarily more efficient, but that the cost of their adoption is on average
dramatically lower: merchants may be better-off adopting even potentially
less efficient practices recommended by commercial norms than developing
even more efficient practices independently, so long as the relatively lower
costs of adopting the former outweigh the superior efficiency of the latter.
The theory of cultural evolution demonstrates that commercial norms are
likely to provide a more cost-effective means of adopting a complete set of
commercial practices than the alternative of individually designing each and
every practice. But the theory also demonstrates that the practices recom-
mended by those norms are unlikely to be even nearly optimal.4
2 The incorporation strategy is implicit in much of the history of contract law but reached
its zenith in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. It can be traced at least as far back
as the 17th century. See L. S. Sutherland, The Law Merchant in England in the 17th and
18th Centuries, 17 149-76 (Transactions Royal Hist Socy Series No 4, 1934); and W. Mitch-
ell, An Essay on the History of the Law Merchant (1904).
' For two recent articles that do go beyond the market-evolutionary metaphor to analyze
how evolution might affect the likely efficiency of commercial practice, see Robert D.
Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law,
14 Intl Rev L & Econ 215 (1994) (using game theory to argue that social norms in a free
business community will be efficient in the absence of nonconvexities or spillovers to other
communities); and Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 Harv L
Rev 641 (1996) (using chaos theory and the ideas of path-dependence and evolutionary acci-
dents to argue against the efficiency of commercial norms).
' For purposes of this article, an "optimal" practice is one that cannot be improved at any
cost. This usage of "optimal" is at odds with another common economic usage. Some econ-
omists define a practice as "optimal" if it produces the best possible result taking into ac-
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Thus, by distinguishing between the costs of adopting a practice and the
efficiency of a practice once adopted, the theory of cultural evolution con-
firms the view that commercial norms provide the most cost-effective
means for merchants to select a system of commercial practices. The theory
of cultural evolution explains why a merchant would find it rational to rely
in general on a system of commercial norms instead of attempting to design
every contracting practice on her own. Similarly, it explains why lawmak-
ers would find it rational to rely in general on the incorporation strategy to
determine a system of contract default rules. But the theory of cultural evo-
lution also predicts that the commercial practices recommended by com-
mercial norms are not likely to be even nearly optimal.5 Thus, although
the theory of cultural evolution makes clear that the system of commer-
cial norms is itself a more efficient means of producing a complete set of
commercial practices than a system in which all practices are individually
designed, it also gives us good reason to believe that the practices recom-
mended by commercial norms would leave significant room for improve-
count not only the gains to those who follow the practice but also the costs of the process
that yields the practice. Therefore, in comparing two practices, the first might produce greater
net wealth once established but the second might be optimal because it costs significantly
less to establish. I argue that because commercial practices are not likely to be optimal, in
the sense I have defined, it is an open question whether they are optimal in the other eco-
nomic sense. My claim is that the theory of cultural evolution demonstrates that evolved
commercial practices could be improved in principle, and in that sense, are not optimal.
Whether alternative legal design strategies are optimal in the other economic sense will de-
pend on whether they are capable of improving on evolved practices at a cost that makes
such alternatives superior to the incorporation strategy.
' My central claim is that the legal rules produced by the incorporation strategy are likely
to be suboptimal. That claim has been previously supported in the contracts literature on two
independent grounds. Goetz and Scott have argued that the process of incorporation itself is
likely to lead to inefficient contract default rules, even if the commercial practices it incorpo-
rates are efficient to begin with. See Charles Goetz and Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Ex-
panded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions between Express and Implied Contract
Terms, 73 Cal L Rev 261 (1985). Michael Klausner has argued that commercial norms may
be suboptimal because network externalities could undermine parties' incentives to develop
superior practices. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Network Exter-
nalities, 81 Va L Rev 757 (1995); Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner, Standardization and
Innovation in Corporate Contracting ("or the Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 Va L Rev
(May 1997, in press). The argument I provide, unlike arguments made by Goetz and Scott
and Klausner, is based on an analysis of the process underlying the evolution of commercial
norms. Even if (1) the process of incorporation costlessly and accurately incorporated existing
commercial practices into legal contract default rules and (2) contracting practices were not
subject to network externalities, my argument purports to demonstrate that the practices recom-
mended by commercial norms would be inefficient, and sometimes significantly so. See also
Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U Pa L Rev 1765 (1996) (arguing that the Uniform Commercial Code's
legalization of otherwise efficient business norms may undermine their efficiency); and Eric A.
Posner, Law, Economics, and Efficient Norms, 144 U Pa L Rev 1697 (1996) (arguing that social
norms are unlikely to evolve efficiently because of, inter alia, information costs, strategic behav-
ior, and negative externalities).
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ment. Given that there is likely to be room to improve commercial prac-
tices, there may be room to improve on the incorporation strategy. Although
there is no reason to seek a wholesale alternative to the incorporation strat-
egy, there is nonetheless good reason to explore supplemental strategies for
enhancing the efficiency of individual commercial practices on a selected
basis.
The case for exclusively relying on the incorporation strategy to deter-
mine the substantive content of the majority of contract default rules cannot
rest on claims for the near optimality of the practices selected by commer-
cial norms. Likewise, the case against using legal design to improve on se-
lected, particular commercial practices cannot rest on the claim that such
practices are unlikely to leave room for improvement. According to the the-
ory of cultural evolution, it is at least possible that merchants and lawmak-
ers alike might be able to improve on an isolated commercial practice,
should they decide to incur the costs of analyzing and experimenting with
alternative practices. Therefore, skepticism directed at individualized legal
design must be premised solely on shortcomings in the legal design process,
such as public choice, psychological, and informational problems.6 Though
these obstacles to legal design cannot be easily dismissed, the fact that
evolved commercial practice is likely to be suboptimal suggests it may be
worthwhile to attempt to overcome them.
This article proceeds in two parts. In Section II, I present the theory of
cultural evolution and use it to explain how and why commercial norms
evolve. I argue that once all the forces affecting the evolution of commer-
cial norms are understood, the only claim that can be sustained on behalf
of their efficiency is that commercial actors would, on average, be better-
off following those norms than attempting to determine for themselves the
best commercial practice to adopt by using trial and error or some rational
cognition process. Having demonstrated that evolved commercial practices
are unlikely to be optimal, I argue in Section III that this demonstration
should bolster the case for seeking to improve on commercial practice by
supplementing the incorporation strategy with alternative legal design strat-
egies. Although the theory of cultural evolution does not itself suggest any
particular alternative design strategies, it does demonstrate that there are
significant efficiency gains to be had if such strategies could be developed.7
In Section IV, I conclude.
6 See notes 79 and 80 below.
7 Alternative legal design strategies would likely utilize theoretical and empirical method-
ology. For an example of the former, see Jody S. Kraus, Decoupling Sales Law from the
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II. EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND COMMERCIAL NORMS
The standard justification of the incorporation strategy is premised on the
assumption that commercial practices are likely to be efficient. Defense of
this claim typically takes the form of a perfunctory allusion to evolutionary
forces acting on commercial parties.' The instinct to comprehend commer-
cial practices within an evolutionary framework derives in part from the
legal-evolutionary tradition dating back to the eighteenth century.9 The idea
that law "is not an autonomous system, but an integral part of the social
life of a community" " extends as far back as the nineteenth-century Ger-
man scholar Friedrich Karl von Savigny," whose thesis was taken up in
turn by Sir Henry James Sumner Maine 2 and John Henry Wigmore. 3 The
more refined thesis that evolution takes place "at the level of specific legal
Acceptance-Rejection Fulcrum, 104 Yale L J 129 (1994) (utilizing theoretical analysis to
identify and correct inefficiencies in sales law). For examples of the latter, see Klausner (cited
in note 5) (suggesting empirical tests to determine the presence of network externalities) and
Kahan and Klausner (cited in note 5) (providing an empirical analysis of event risk covenants
in bond indentures to test for evidence of learning and network externalities).
8 Robert Ellickson has recently proposed a theory according to which nonlegal norms
might effectively and often efficiently regulate behavior instead of, or in spite of, legal norms.
See Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991). Al-
though he uses commercial practice as one of his examples, he does not purport to explain
why human beings came to rely on such norms and how such norms are transmitted and
developed in society. His central claim is that "members of a close-knit group develop and
maintain [nonlegal] norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that
members obtain in the workaday affairs with one another" (id at 167). He sets out to confirm
this hypothesis with empirical evidence, rather than to explain whether and how the truth of
this hypothesis could be explained by the current theory of cultural evolution. Ellickson ar-
gues that "lawmakers interested in the resolution of ... disputes that arise within a group
are unlikely to improve upon the group's customary rules.... This conclusion supports ...
Karl Llewellyn's efforts to incorporate merchant practices into the Uniform Commercial
Code" (id at 283). For criticism of Ellickson's efficiency claim on behalf of informal norms,
see Lewis A. Kornhauser, Are There Cracks in the Foundations of Spontaneous Order? 67
NYU L Rev 647 (1992).
9 See generally Peter Stein, Legal Evolution: The Story of an Idea (1980). See also E.
Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 Colum L Rev 38 (1985)
(classifying legal evolutionary theories as social, doctrinal, economic, or sociobiological);
and Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 Tex L Rev 645 (1985)
(categorizing American evolutionary jurisprudential theories as versions of either social or
reform Darwinism and criticizing Elliott's categories in The Evolutionary Tradition in Juris-
prudence for failing to distinguish between theories that incorporate natural selection and
those that do not).
10 Elliott, at 40 (cited in note 9).
" Id at 40 n7, citing J. Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory
142-43 (1966); and Stein, at 65-68 (cited in note 9).
12 Elliott, at 43 (cited in note 9).
"1 Id at 46.
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doctrines within a legal system" '" was advanced by Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., 5 Arthur Linton Corbin, 6 and Robert Charles Clark. 7
This early literature provided the foundation for more economically and
biologically sophisticated applications of evolutionary theory to the law.
Perhaps the most well-known and recent application of evolutionary theory
to the law is presented in the law-and-economics literature addressing the
question of whether the common law evolves efficiently. 8 There is also a
literature exploring the extent to which the existence of law, as well as its
content, can be explained by sociobiological, evolutionary processes."t The
central challenge facing each of these theories is to explain why and how
the law's development is subject to evolutionary forces. For contemporary
purposes, ° the question is why and how legal change is subjected to forces
like natural selection that cause law to develop, in some sense, adaptively.
All of the traditional legal-evolutionary theories have difficulty demonstrat-
ing the existence, much less dynamics, of an evolutionary force.2' In con-
trast, there is an obvious candidate for the evolutionary force acting on the
development of commercial practices: the competitive market.
While one might doubt that the legal system, or particular laws within it,
are subject to evolutionary forces, it is difficult to argue that commercial
practices are not. All other things being equal, commercial actors with effi-
14 Id at 50.
15 Id.
6 Arthur Linton Corbin, in The Law and the Judges, 3 Yale L Rev 234, 249 (1914), ar-
gued that "the growth of the law is an evolutionary process."
" Clark argues that the corporate culture develops in a "cumulative, evolutionary way."
See Charles Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution
and Reform, 87 Yale L J 90, 92 (1977). Clark's claim is that corporate and commercial law
evolve according to patterns of change that act to increase the law's effect in reducing costs
of corporate business transactions. See Charles Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal
Evolution, 90 Yale L J 1238 (1981); and Elliott, at 60-62 (cited in note 9) (discussing Clark's
Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution).
8 See, for example, the citations in nn 2, 3, 4 in Gillian K Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution
of Legal Rules, 80 Georgetown L J 583 (1992).
"9 See Elliott, at 71-90 (cited in note 9) (discussing the theories of A. G. Keller, Jack
Hirshleifer, Richard Epstein, and William H. Rodgers, Jr.).
20 The pre-Darwinian legal-evolutionists did not understand natural selection and even
some post-Darwinian legal-evolutionists did not recognize the distinction between evolution-
ary and nonevolutionary development. See, for example, Elliott, at 41-43 (cited in note 9);
and Hovenkamp, at 648-49 (cited in note 9).
2! Although the literature on the efficiency of the common law identifies the incentives of
litigants to bring suit as a force affecting its development, it falls short of explaining how
that or other forces cause the common law to become more efficient (the criterion of success
for the common law that is analogous to the criterion of adaptivity in biology). Thus, the
incentives of litigants to bring suit is a force that has yet to be shown to be an evolutionary
force.
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cient practices are more likely to succeed, stay in business, and continue
those practices than actors with inefficient practices. In short, this "market-
based evolutionary" account holds that efficient practices will be favored
in the marketplace. Indeed, this is precisely the reasoning routinely used
by many commercial law scholars who endorse an evolutionary account of
commercial practices.2 As straightforward and compelling as this reasoning
appears to be, it is nonetheless insufficient to establish the claim that com-
mercial practices are likely to be nearly optimal and thus unlikely to leave
room for improvement by alternative legal design strategies. Application of
contemporary evolutionary theory to the development of commercial prac-
tice demonstrates that the market-based evolutionary account isolates only
one of a number of evolutionary forces, none of which are likely to produce
even nearly optimal practices on average. Although the market does consti-
tute a strong evolutionary force that tends to increase the efficiency of com-
mercial practices, the explanation of why and how commercial practices
evolve provides no grounds for believing that evolved commercial practices
will be nearly optimal. Moreover, analysis of other nonmarket forces acting
on the evolution of commercial norms suggests that some evolved commer-
cial practices will be significantly suboptimal. Thus, there is room, in prin-
ciple, to improve on evolved commercial practices and the legal rules the
incorporation strategy derives from them. In this section, I introduce and
use the fundamental tenets of the most advanced contemporary theory of
cultural evolution available to explain why and how commercial norms
evolve.
A. The Evolution of Cultural Norms
The most sophisticated and comprehensive theory of the evolution of cul-
tural norms available is provided by Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson in
Culture and the Evolutionary Process.23 Boyd and Richerson present a for-
22 See, for example, Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98
Harv L Rev 1393, 1417 (1985) ("[F]irms that systematically act impulsively or underesti-
mate the risks of investments will, in theory at least, be weeded out and replaced by firms
that calculate risks more carefully."); and Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and
the Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks, 19 J Legal Stud 535, 576-77 (1990) ("[O]ne
may argue for an evolutionary or natural selection model of commercial practice. In unregu-
lated markets, those best suited to handle risk will survive in open market competition. ...
Those actors who make decisions in a manner more consistent with expected utility theory
(more "rationally") will approach optimality, and successful actors may signal the proper
route to others. Even if they prosper by luck, they will serve a useful social function so long
as others, seeing their success, can mimic their behavior in the future.").
23 Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson, Culture and the Evolutionary Process (1985). See
also L. L. Cavalli-Sforza, Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative Approach
(1981); L. L. Cavalli-Sforza and M. W. Feldman, Cultural versus Genetic Adaptation, 80
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mal theory24 of the evolution of cultural norms in which norms evolve
through processes partly analogous to those that produce genetic evolution.
They defend what they call the "dual inheritance theory" in which genetic
and cultural inheritance systems coexist and interact.25 Their theory explains
how genetic evolution can plausibly be thought to have generated a system
of cultural evolution that in turn advances genetic fitness. But they also ex-
plain how the mechanisms of cultural evolution can lead to maladaptive dis-
positions that undermine genetic fitness.26 Ultimately, the system of cultural
evolution identified by Boyd and Richerson would be produced by genetic
evolution because, on the whole, it maximizes genetic fitness compared to
a purely genetic system of evolution. A system of cultural inheritance pro-
duces adaptive advantages increasing genetic fitness that outweigh the dis-
advantages caused by maladaptive cultural norms that reduce genetic fit-
ness. The distinction between individual and social learning is central to
Proceedings Natl Academy Science 4993 (1983); and L. L. Cavalli-Sforza et al, Theory and
Observation in Cultural Transmission, 218 Science 19 (1982).
24 Boyd and Richerson present mathematical models of the evolutionary forces they iden-
tify and mathematical proofs for the propositions they assert. Throughout my presentation of
their theory, I make no attempt to present or assess their formal models and proofs. Instead,
I assume their theory's formal validity and present a nonmathematical summary of its central
features and main results. Thus, this article is concerned solely with the application of Boyd
and Richerson's theory to the question of whether and how commercial norms evolve, and
not with the independent merits of their theory.
25 Although Boyd and Richerson's theory holds that genetic and cultural inheritance sys-
tems are in many ways analogous, they claim that cultural evolution is subject to significantly
different processes as well. The sharpest distinction between cultural and genetic transmis-
sion structures is that the transmission of acquired behaviors, or mature phenotypes, from
one individual to another is not possible in genetic transmission. The view that behavioral
characteristics acquired after birth could be biologically inherited, a view advanced by the
pre-Darwinian evolutionist Jean Baptiste Lamarck (Zoological Philosophy 106-27 [1914]),
cannot be reconciled with the modem theory of genetic transmission. Boyd and Richerson
(cited in note 23) agree: "One of the fundamental tenets of evolutionary theory has been that
developmental events in an individual's life do not affect its germ cells and thus cannot affect
the genetic material that the individual transmits to the next generation" (id at 118, citing
A. Weismann, The Germ Plasm: A Theory of Heredity [1893]). A system of cultural trans-
mission, however, can transmit acquired behaviors nongenetically. Boyd and Richerson's
theory of cultural evolution explains how this nonbiological "Lamarckian" inheritance pro-
cess itself has evolved through genetic evolution. The theory also shows how a Darwinian
selection process can act on the transmission of cultural norms just as it acts on the transmis-
sion of genetic characteristics.
26 Although natural selection acting on cultural transmission typically favors genetically
adaptive traits, it sometimes does not. Both genetic and cultural transmission can take place
"vertically," from genetic parents to genetic offspring. But unlike genetic transmission, cul-
tural transmission can also take place "obliquely," from a nongenetic parent to a child, and
"horizontally," from one peer to another. When both transmission processes are vertical,
and therefore symmetric, cultural variation always favors genetic fitness. But when the trans-
mission processes are asymmetric, and cultural transmission is thus oblique or horizontal,
natural selection acting on cultural transmission can produce genetically maladaptive traits.
See Boyd and Richerson at 173-74, 198, 285-86 (cited in note 23).
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Boyd and Richerson's explanation of the genetic evolution of cultural in-
heritance, and it is therefore central to understanding the cultural evolution
of commercial norms.
1. Individual versus Social Learning. In Boyd and Richerson's model,
the biological and behavioral characteristics of all organisms can in princi-
ple be explained and predicted by the interaction between genes, environ-
ment, and culture. They restrict the definition of "environment" to "those
processes in the physical and biological realm that affect the population of
interest but that are somehow external to the population itself."27 Given this
definition of environment, their definition of culture makes environment
and culture mutually exclusive categories.28 They define "culture" in gen-
eral as "the transmission from one generation to the next, via teaching and
imitation, of knowledge, values, and other factors that influence behav-
ior." 29 More specifically, they define culture as "information capable of af-
fecting individuals' phenotypes which they acquire from other conspecifics
by teaching or imitation." 30 Although they refer to the "knowledge, values,
and other factors that influence behavior" as beliefs and desires, they iden-
tify these notions with behavioral dispositions.3
However, only those behavioral dispositions whose particular variations
are capable of transmission count as culture. Thus, behavioral traits whose
acquisition by offspring require the presence of a parent are not culture un-
less there are particular parental variants of the disposition that can be trans-
mitted to the offspring by the parents. Behavioral dispositions acquired
through habitat imprinting are not culture since that process cannot transmit
variants in behavioral disposition.32 Similarly, behavioral dispositions ac-
quired through "guided learning" are not culture. Guided learning takes
place when individuals physically follow a model, typically their parents,
27 Id at 5.
28 Id.
29 Id at 2.
" Id at 33. An individual's "phenotype" is "its body and behavior as we observe them;
this is distinct from its genotype, which is its set of genes." See Mark Ridley, Evolution 28-
29 (1993). An individual's genotype controls its possible phenotypes, but the actual pheno-
type it manifests can be influenced by the environmental conditions to which the individual
is subjected. A "conspecific" is a member of the same species as another individual.
"' Boyd and Richerson (cited in note 23) share with most social scientists skepticism of
the claim that either subjective or third-party reports of the propositional attitudes, like beliefs
and desires, of any given subjects provide accurate descriptions of the actual behavioral dis-
positions that account for the subjects' observed behavior (id at 38).
32 "Habitat imprinting" occurs when, for example, young individuals form an attachment
to the area in which they are born and thus acquire behaviors specific to that locality. "The
homing behavior of Pacific Salmon and many migratory birds are well-known examples" (id
at 35).
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through the environment and thereby acquire behavioral traits similar to
their parents by virtue of similar environmental exposure. These disposi-
tions are not culture because the process of their acquisition does not trans-
mit variations from the parent, or more generally the "model" or "cultural
parent," 33 to the individual acquiring the disposition, whom Boyd and
Richerson term the "naive individual."
The behavioral dispositions that constitute culture are acquired by social
learning. These dispositions are transmitted to naive individuals either be-
cause they are imitated by them or taught to them by models. Variant be-
havioral dispositions that are acquired through social learning, therefore, are
transmitted from one individual to another through imitation or teaching.34
Although a given behavioral disposition might be transmitted by social
learning, it might instead be acquired purely through individual learning.
Behavioral dispositions acquired exclusively through individual learning re-
sult from trial and error or rational calculation rather than imitation or
teaching. By definition, they are not explained by cultural evolution because
they are not the result of cultural transmission.35 The system of cultural in-
heritance that Boyd and Richerson present essentially consists of a system
of social learning, although some of its distinctive features result from the
effects of combined social and individual learning on cultural transmission.
2. The Comparative Advantage of Social Learning. Boyd and Richer-
son argue that although individual learning will be superior to social learn-
ing in certain circumstances, the reverse is far more often the case. Their
analysis is based on the familiar premise that individual learning is costly
relative to social learning. Individual learning requires trial and error or ra-
tional calculation, both of which potentially occasion significant costs.
Boyd and Richerson observe that trial and error learning
can be costly and error prone. Learning trials occupy time and energy that could
be allocated to other components of fitness, and may entail a considerable risk to
the individual as well. Because of these costs, the investment of individuals in de-
" "Cultural parent" and "model" are synonyms: both describe "the set of individuals
who enculturate a given person" (id at 35). Cultural parents are not necessarily biological
parents and vice versa (id at 7).
4 Boyd and Richerson's analysis omits consideration of the effects of teaching on cultural
transmission and thus only takes into account social learning through imitation. They argue
that these effects are sufficiently similar to those of imitation, and that including them in their
formal model would gratuitously complicate the analysis (id at 144-45). My discussion will
therefore omit consideration of this mode of social learning as well.
35 But individual learning does interact with social learning and therefore plays an impor-
tant role in cultural evolution. In particular, the transmission process of "guided variation"
(see Section IIB) demonstrates how individual learning can change an inherited disposition
after an individual has inherited it.
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termining the locally favored behavior must be limited, and individual learning can
lead to errors. Individuals may fail to discover an adaptive behavior, or a maladap-
tive one may be retained because it was reinforced by chance. When these costs
are important, selection ought to favor shortcuts to learning-ways that an organ-
ism can achieve phenotypic flexibility without paying the full costs of learning.36
Similarly, the rational calculation method of individual learning is costly
and error prone. Boyd and Richerson consider the problem of the "Bayes-
ian horticulturalist," in which an individual must calculate his expected
crop yield and decide how much insurance to purchase for protection
against underproduction.37 In order to solve the problem, the horticulturalist
would have to (1) assign a utility value to different outcomes, (2) update
his estimate of the average yield of his plot by determining the relationship
between the present year's yield and the long-run mean, and (3) determine
the prior probability distribution of outcomes in his environment.3" Boyd
and Richerson argue that this rational decision-making process requires the
individual to specify "an unrealistically large amount of information about
the environment . . . and then perform computations that are too difficult
36 Boyd and Richerson, at 14 (cited in note 23).
3 In their example, the insurance takes the form of an informal contract between the indi-
vidual and his farmer-neighbor, according to which the individual is entitled to a share of
his neighbor's crops in return for the individual contributing labor to his neighbor's farm.
The individual's problem is to determine how much labor to contribute to his neighbor's
farm. That, in turn, requires him to estimate his long-run average crop yield and the variance
from year to year (id at 87-92).
38 In order to solve the problem of the Bayesian horticulturalist, a Bayesian must use a
continuous version of Bayes Theorem requiring calculations most individuals cannot under-
stand, much less compute in their heads (id). But even applying a discrete version of Bayes
Theorem to a straightforward problem requires rather complex calculations. To understand
the complexity of using even a discrete version of Bayes Theorem, consider the Bayesian
solution to the following problem: (1) scientists have discovered that symptom S provides an
imperfect screening device for detecting disease D; (2) if an individual has the disease, there
is an 80% chance that he will have symptom S; (3) if an individual does not have the disease,
there is still a 20% chance he will have symptom S; (4) 33% of the population has the dis-
ease; (5) Smith has been drawn randomly from the population and has symptom S. What is
the probability that Smith has disease X? The Bayesian formula for calculating the posterior
probability that Smith has the disease is
PD'S) = p(D)p(SID)
p(D)p(SID) + p(-D)p(SI-D)'
where D = has disease D and S = has symptom S. To solve the equation, assign p(D) =
0.33, p(SID) = 0.80, and p(SI -D) = 0.20. Thus,
0.33 X 0.80
p(DIS) = 0.33 X 0.80 = 0.67.
(0.33 X 0.80) + (0.67 X 0.20)
This example is adapted from Gerd Gigerenzer, Why the Distinction between Single-Event
Probabilities and Frequencies Is Important for Psychology (and vice versa), in G. Wright
and P. Ayton, eds, Subjective Probability, at 129, 145, 150 (1994).
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for anyone but mathematicians .... Even modem corporations that can af-
ford to expend enormous resources in gathering and analyzing data are un-
able to conform to the canons of Bayesian rationality." 39
Given the difficulty human beings confront in using Bayesian decision
procedure effectively for most decisions, rational calculation must be un-
dertaken in some other way. Boyd and Richerson turn to behavioral deci-
sion theory to determine how individuals actually make decisions and
whether their decision-making processes are likely to be effective.4" In par-
ticular, they rely on the well-known research of cognitive psychologists
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky4' and Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross42
to establish the claim that human beings use "rules of thumb," or what
Kahneman and Tversky call "heuristics," as a method of rational calcula-
tion, and that these heuristics sometimes lead to systematic, cognitive biases
that cause human decision-making to fall far short of the standard for ideal,
rational decision-making set by Bayesian decision theory. Although these
heuristics "often work well, . . . [they] occasionally . . .lead to behavior
that is irrational according to the canons of Bayesian rationality." 43 Kahne-
man and Tversky's work indicates that while heuristics provide a viable and
sometimes effective altemative to Bayesian decision theory, human beings
nevertheless "ordinarily make quite poor judgments, particularly when
problems are novel or require statistical evaluation .... [Heuristics] cause
individuals to form confident opinions based on inadequate or badly biased
information and then hold to these opinions in the face of substantial dis-
confirming data."'
" Boyd and Richerson, at 92-93 (cited in note 23) (citation omitted).
40 Id at 93-94.
41 See, for example, D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds, Judgment under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1982).
42 See, for example, R. Nisbett and L. Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcom-
ings of Social Judgment (1980); and R. E. Nisbett and R. D. Wilson, Telling More Than We
Can Know: Verbal Reports of Mental Process, 84 Psych Rev 231 (1977).
4 Boyd and Richerson, at 93 (cited in note 23).
Id at 168. For a summary of the data demonstrating how Kahneman and Tversky's
"judgment heuristics" of representativeness, availability, and anchoring lead to systematic
cognitive error, see id at 168-69. See generally, Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, eds (cited
in note 41). Among the most well-known cognitive errors alleged by Kahneman and Tversky
are (1) the tendency to have confidence in judgments greater than the justification provided
by relative frequencies of successful performance ("overconfidence bias"), (2) the tendency,
under particular circumstances, to assign a higher probability to the possibility of two events
occurring than the possibility of one of those events occurring alone ("the conjunction fal-
lacy"), and (3) the tendency to ignore underlying base rates, or relative frequencies, when
calculating single-event probabilities, "the base-rate fallacy." For summary and application
of Kahneman and Tversky's "heuristics and bias" program to the law, see Robert E. Scott,
Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on the Relationship between
Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 Cal L Rev 329 (1986); Ward Ed-
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Since Boyd and Richerson published their theory, recent work in cogni-
tive psychology has called into question the methodology and conclusions
of the "heuristics and biases" program associated with Kahneman and
Tversky. For example, recent research indicates that some of the cognitive
errors identified by Kahneman and Tversky can be eliminated by chang-
ing the description of the problems their subjects were asked to solve from
single-event probability descriptions to frequency descriptions.45 Thus, be-
cause Kahneman and Tversky postulate that humans use heuristics in order
to explain cognitive bias, the research arguing that Kahneman and Tversky
overestimate cognitive bias also calls into question the heuristics they claim
humans use when making judgments under uncertainty. In addition, that re-
search also questions the premise that rational decision making should be
measured by Bayesian standards.46 Although the status of the heuristics and
wards and Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their Implications for the Law,
59 S Cal L Rev 225 (1986).
" For example, Gigerenzer redescribed the problem, in note 38, using "natural sam-
pling," which gives subjects frequencies directly: "Your tribe has been afflicted for one year
by a previously unknown and fatal disease. Everyone suspected of having the new disease
is sent to you. Your were lucky to discover one symptom that seems to signal the outbreak
of the disease .... So far you have seen 30 people suspected of having the disease. Ten of
these turned out to have the disease, 20 did not. Of the 10 persons afflicted by the disease,
8 showed the symptom; of the 20 persons not affected, only 4 had the symptom. Now they
bring in number 31. She has the symptom" (id at 149-50). Gigerenzer argues that when the
problem is rephrased in this way, subjects no longer commit the base-rate fallacy. The reason
is that the solution to the problem now only requires "two absolute frequencies: the number
a of people with symptom and disease, and the number b of people with symptom and no
disease. These frequencies are a = 8 and b = 4, respectively. The algorithm to calculate the
relative frequency f(DIS) of people with disease D among those who have the symptom S is
f(DIS) - a _ 8
a+b 8+4
If you are a Bayesian and want to calculate from the frequencies monitored so far the poste-




Compare now this algorithm to the algorithm [in note 38]. ... The general point ... is that
the way information is represented in an experiment, or encountered in a natural environ-
ment, can require reasoning of different complexity. Even if these algorithms are mathemati-
cally equivalent, as they are in the thought experiment just presented, they can be computa-
tionally and psychologically different" (id at 150-51). For a similar point, see Leda
Cosmides and James Tooby, Are Humans Good Intuitive Statisticians after All? Rethinking
Some Conclusions from the Literature on Judgment under Uncertainty, 58 Cognition 1
(1996).
6 See, for example, Gerd Gigerenzer, How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Be-
yond "Heuristics and Biases," in Wolfgang Stroebe and Miles Hewstone, eds, European
Review of Social Psychology (1991); Gerd Gigerenzer and David J. Murray, Thinking: From
Insight to Intuitive Statistics, in Cognition as Intuitive Statistics 137 (1987); Gerd Gigerenzer,
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bias research is now unclear,47 few would dispute the claim that the vast
majority of the everyday problems human beings confront are not amenable
to decision procedures that are both optimal and cost-effective. Whatever
their source, individuals are likely to commit substantial errors, by any rea-
sonable measure of rationality, when they attempt to solve problems using
rational cognition.48 Thus, the methods human beings actually use for ratio-
nal calculation are almost certain to be less costly to use than a rationally
ideal decision procedure or the trial and error method, yet they will often
be unreliable.
In sum, individual learning is a relatively poor device for acquiring adap-
tive behavioral dispositions. Yet human decisions and behaviors, for the
Rationality: Why Social Context Matters, in P. B. Baltes and U. Staudinger, eds, Inter-
active Minds: Life-Span Perspectives on the Social Foundation of Cognition (1996); Gerd
Gigerenzer, The Bounded Rationality of Probabilistic Mental Models, in K. I. Manktelow
and D. E. Over, eds, Rationality, at 284 (1993); Gerd Gigerenzer, The Superego, the Ego,
and the Id in Statistical Reasoning, in Gideon Keren and Charles Lewis, eds, A Hand-
book for Data Analysis in the Behavioral Sciences, at 311 (1993); Gerd Gigerenzer,
From Tools to Theories: A Heuristics of Discovery in Cognitive Psychology, 98 Psych Rev
254 (1991); Gerd Gigerenzer and Ulrich Hoffrage, How to Make the Mind Reason the Bayes-
ian Way (unpublished manuscript on file with author, 1993); and Gigerenzer (cited in note
38).
" Gerd Gigerenzer has been the leading critic of Kahneman and Tversky's work. See cita-
tions in note 46 above. Kahneman and Tversky have recently responded to Gigerenzer's criti-
cisms, see Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions: A
Reply to Gigerenzer's Critique, 103 Psych Rev 582-91 (1996). Gigerenzer has replied to
their response, see Gerd Gigerenzer, On Narrow Norms and Vague Heuristics: A Rebuttal to
Kahneman and Tversky, 103 Psych Rev 592-96 (1996).
" Gerd Gigerenzer's work is illustrative in this regard. He demonstrates, for example, that
Kahneman and Tversky's "overconfidence bias" can be eliminated by asking parties to esti-
mate the frequency of their errors, rather than asking them the static probability that they
answered any particular question correctly (a question that Gigerenzer correctly observes
would be incoherent to a statistician who regards probabilities as identical to frequencies, as
most statisticians do). But such an experiment does not make the overconfidence bias disap-
pear. Instead, it demonstrates that human decision making depends- on what questions hu-
mans ask themselves in order to determine the course of action they should take. Kahneman
and Tversky's work demonstrates that individuals will (through the use of a subjective proba-
bility assignment) express a level of confidence in their performance on any discrete task that
exceeds the level of confidence that, intuitively, would be warranted by the frequency of their
errors, even though they can accurately estimate that frequency value when asked to do so.
Thus, if human beings make decisions based on subjective probabilities, as is reasonable to
suppose they sometimes do, then the fact that they can accurately estimate their performance
rate over a set of similar events provides no basis for claiming their decisions will be "ratio-
nal," on any reasonable theory of what rationality requires in individual decision making. If
individuals either fail to undertake to estimate the error rate of their performance over time
or simply ignore that estimate when making decisions, the likely accuracy of their potential
frequency estimates is irrelevant to determining the rationality of their decisions. Since the
subjective probabilities indicate their actual level of confidence in any given case, it seems
likely that these probabilities will play a strong role in decision making, and it is these proba-
bilities that are, intuitively, inconsistent with individuals' performance error rates.
EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL NORMS
most part, have the "semblance of rationality." 4 9 Boyd and Richerson rec-
oncile these claims by showing how a system in which adaptive norms
evolve through social learning could have been, and in fact was, produced
by genetic evolution. Thus, they argue that natural selection acting on ge-
netic transmission would produce a system of cultural inheritance that
strongly favors social learning over individual learning, so strongly in fact,
that individuals will often "ignore the dictates of individual learning.""
This is the natural consequence of biological evolution given the fact that
individual learning is typically a poor method of acquiring adaptive behav-
ioral dispositions in most human environments. Although individual learn-
ing will be favored when it has relatively low cost and high accuracy, Boyd
and Richerson argue that this is seldom the case:
When it is easy to determine the locally best behavior, we expect learning to be
quite accurate, but when it is difficult, individual learning should be inaccurate.
Given that learning is imperfect .... natural selection will favor an increased
reliance on culturally inherited beliefs whenever (1) the error rate of individual
learning is substantially greater than that for social learning and (2) the environment
is reasonably predictable .... It is our intuition that it is often difficult for individu-
als to determine the locally optimal behavior. Consider, for example, the problem
of the Bayesian horticulturalist .... We believe that many human decisions have
this character. Because they have many effects that are spread out over a long pe-
riod of time, it is difficult for individuals to determine the best choice by trial and
error; because the consequences of alternative choices depend on a complex, vari-
able, hard-to-understand environment, it is difficult for individuals to deduce the
optimal behavior. The result is that a reliance on individual learning will lead to
frequent errors. If this intuition is correct, and if the social learning theorists ...
are also correct that information can be acquired easily and accurately by social
learning, then the models [we] analyzed here suggest that a strong dependence on
cultural transmission usually provides a better way to acquire beliefs about the envi-
ronment than a strong dependence on individual learning.5
The claim that social learning often will be superior to individual learn-
ing, and thus the claim that a system of cultural inheritance could result
from genetic evolution, must be supported by an account of the forces that
transform cultural inheritance from a nonevolutionary system, in which the
frequency of cultural variants in the population remains the same, to an evo-
lutionary system, in which the relative frequency of adaptive cultural vari-
ants increases over time. In the next section, I present Boyd and Richer-
" Boyd and Richerson, at 93 (cited in note 23).
50 Id at 130.
1' Id at 116-17.
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son's account of these forces and describe how they would affect the
cultural evolution of commercial norms.
B. The Evolution of Commercial Norms
In order to apply Boyd and Richerson's theory to the problem of under-
standing the evolution of commercial norms, I begin by assuming that all
commercial actors are exclusively motivated to maximize profit. Given this
motivation, individuals must acquire business practices, some of which be-
come so regular and widespread that they constitute a statistical norm. For
cultural evolution to play a significant role in generating such business
norms, social learning must have significant advantages over individual
learning in many commercial environments. This proposition is quite plau-
sible. In order to determine the optimal trade practices even for relatively
common transactions, commercial parties would have to engage in analyses
at least as complex as those Boyd and Richerson's Bayesian horticulturalist
must undertake. Consider, for example, the problem of structuring a long-
term supply transaction between an oil and gas company and a public util-
ity. In order to provide the optimal price and quantity terms, the parties
would have to (1) assign a monetary value to the various contingencies that
might arise throughout the course of the relationship, (2) assign a prior
probability distribution over these contingencies, and (3) update their esti-
mates of these probabilities throughout the course of their relationship.
Among other things, they would have to decide what constitutes a conform-
ing grade of oil; how much time should be allowed for transportation; under
what conditions the seller has the right to inspect, reject, and return deliv-
ered oil; what conditions excuse each party's performance; and what reme-
dies are available for breach. The Bayesian decision procedure for deciding
these questions would present a formidable, if not impossible, task. In order
to be meaningful, it would require access to statistical information ordi-
narily unavailable to typical parties. Nor do heuristics provide a promising
avenue for solving these problems. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what
heuristic could be used to decide, for example, how much time the seller
should be giveh to inspect or what deviations from a specified or estimated
quantity promised should be tolerated. Moreover, to the extent Kahneman
and Tversky's research is accurate, the heuristics that humans tend to use
often lead to irrational results.52 Finally, the trial and error method would
require considerable experience before any result could be inferred and,
even then, it would be difficult to draw conclusions from experience be-
52 But see Scott (cited in note 44), arguing that much of the evidence offered in support
of cognitive error can instead be explained as the result of a rational precommitment strategy.
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cause it would be difficult to determine which practices had which effects.
Thus, if Boyd and Richerson are right that human beings would be geneti-
cally predisposed to rely principally on social learning rather than individ-
ual learning when attempting to solve a problem in a complex environment,
it is plausible to suppose that commercial actors would be predisposed to
rely predominantly on social learning to acquire many of their commercial
practices.53
All cultural transmission requires that the naive individual acquire behav-
ioral dispositions at least in part by imitating a "model." Individuals
choose as their models others whom they believe have succeeded in achiev-
ing the goal the naive individual desires to achieve. For example, an auto-
mobile manufacturer would use as models other automobile manufacturers
he believes have been profitable. Thus, the cultural transmission contem-
plated by Boyd and Richerson's theory does not hypothesize that a naive
individual acquires a behavioral disposition by unselectively imitating
members of the general population. Rather, a naive individual first uses his
underlying goal to select a subset of individuals from the general population
whose members the naive individual believes have been successful at
achieving the naive individual's goal. The process naive individuals use to
select their models may be either conscious or unconscious. Boyd and Rich-
erson's theory requires only that individuals somehow identify a subset of
the general population whose members in fact, even if not by conscious
intention, serve as models for purposes of acquiring certain behavioral dis-
positions. According to Boyd and Richerson, humans are genetically predis-
posed both to select models, consciously or not, and to acquire behavioral
dispositions at least in part by imitating models.
The first evolutionary force acting on cultural transmission is natural
selection, the only such force affecting genetic transmission. Applied to
cultural transmission, natural selection will favor those dispositions most
common among models. The process of natural selection takes place
independently of any intentional selection of behavioral traits, simply by
virtue of the statistical probability that individuals randomly imitating mod-
els will themselves become models whose dispositions will be imitated and
thus reproduced (just as natural selection acting on genetic transmission de-
" This insight has been recognized in legal scholarship. For example, Goetz and Scott
(cited in note 5) argue that there is an evolutionary process beginning with the development
of customary business practice and leading to legal norms through incorporation by refer-
ence. They claim that these customary formulations "are not only cheaper, but they are also
better than do-it-yourself ones. . . . [T]he process of contractual formulation is subject to
inherent endogenous hazards that emerge and undergo correction only over time. Accumu-
lated experiences are therefore very important in shaping customary contractual prototypes"
(id at 278). They even refer to this process as "quasi-Darwinian" (id).
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pends on differential probabilities of genetic traits being reproduced). Those
traits most common among models are likely to be those that increase the
likelihood of an individual becoming a model; because they are the most
common, they are likely to be imitated more often than others in a system
in which individuals randomly imitate models. And just as the strength of
natural selection acting on genetic transmission is directly proportional to
the extent of genetic variation among parents,54 the strength of natural selec-
tion acting on cultural transmission is directly proportional to the extent of
cultural variation among cultural parents or models. Natural selection
would therefore become weaker as it reduces variation. This natural de-
crease in the strength of natural selection is counteracted by the force of
random cultural variation. Such variation can occur as a result of individu-
als who (1) imperfectly imitate a properly modeled behavioral disposition,
(2) forget or misremember accurately imitated behavioral dispositions, or
(3) accurately imitated and acquired a behavioral disposition that was in-
completely or erroneously performed by the model.5
Natural selection would act on the cultural transmission of commercial
practices just as it acts on cultural transmission generally. Individuals would
choose, consciously or not, as their models commercial actors who appear
to have succeeded in the market. For example, an automobile retailer might
decide to offer a 5-year warranty on all cars he sells because he is predis-
posed randomly to imitate some models (dealers he believes to be success-
ful), and these models offer such a warranty. If the retailer had instead in-
vestigated the advantages and disadvantages of offering different length
warranties, rather than simply imitating the warranty practice of others, his
decision to offer a 5-year warranty would not have been the result of cul-
tural transmission. But because he decided to offer that warranty solely by
virtue of his disposition (conscious or not) to imitate successful dealers, his
decision qualifies as the product of cultural transmission. Thus, instead of
4 Natural selection can occur only if the population from which characteristics are inher-
ited exhibits some variation. For example, if all parents had precisely the same genes, no
children could inherit different genes. Therefore, there would be no difference among the
survival/reproduction rates of genes. If the population exhibits variation, however, natural
selection favors those characteristics that reproduce at a higher rate than others. For example,
given that different parents have different genes, the gene distribution in a subsequent genera-
tion will differ from that of its previous generation depending on which members of the pre-
vious generation successfully reproduced. The greater the extent of variation in the previous
generation, the more genes there are to be subject to different reproduction rates. Thus, the
more genetic variation in the previous generation, the more dramatic the effect differential
reproduction rates will have on the distribution of genes in the subsequent generation. Thus,
the strength of natural selection acting on genetic transmission is directly proportional to the
amount of variation among parents.
" See Boyd and Richerson, at 67-68 (cited in note 23).
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making a rational choice among possible behaviors, natural selection takes
place when individuals follow their predisposition to acquire a behavior
simply by randomly mimicking the commercial practices of models. Those
practices that tend to be correlated with market success will gradually be
favored by natural selection. The more efficient an individual's commercial
practices, the more likely he is to succeed in the market and thus become
a model for others. Thus, if the practice of offering a 5-year warranty con-
tributes to market success, those dealers who engage in that practice will
be, all things equal, more likely to succeed, remain in business, and become
models for other dealers who acquire business practices by imitating mod-
els. And just as efficient practices will be favored by natural selection, inef-
ficient practices will be "selected against" by the market, and, in turn, se-
lected against by natural selection acting on the cultural transmission of
commercial norms.
Although this process might quickly drive the mean variants of commer-
cial practices toward the optimum, we would expect that the process of nat-
ural selection acting on the transmission of contracting practices, as op-
posed to other commercial practices, will be relatively slow. This is because
the correlation between the contracting practices, which give rise to legal
obligation, and market success is quite indirect. In general, success in the
market is likely to be influenced far more heavily by product demand, pro-
duction costs, marketing, internal management, product competition, and
noncontractual commercial practices, than the contracting practices to be
given legal effect through contract law. To be sure, some of these practices
will be quite important, but many of them will contribute only a small frac-
tion even to the success of a single contract, much less an entire business.
Nonetheless, natural selection will be a force acting to increase the fre-
quency of efficient variants of both contractual and noncontractual commer-
cial practices.
Natural selection is the only force acting on cultural transmission that
relies exclusively on imitation. However, there are other forces acting on
cultural transmission that combine imitation with individual learning. One
of these forces is called "guided variation." When individuals acquire their
initial variants of behavioral dispositions, or "initial phenotypes," by imi-
tating a model, and then modify those initial phenotypes through individual
learning, the resulting "mature" phenotypes will typically differ from the
initial ones: "Variants favored by learning will be more common, and those
that are not favored will be less common. Finally, suppose that mature indi-
viduals then serve as models for young individuals in the next generation.
This will cause the distribution of initial phenotypes in the next generation
to be different from the distribution in this generation. Thus, cultural trans-
mission of the initial phenotype and its subsequent modification by learning
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combine to produce a force increasing the frequency of the variants favored
by learning, even in the absence of natural selection. This effect is the es-
sence of guided variation." 56 As in the force of natural selection, the force
of guided variation requires an individual initially to acquire a behavioral
disposition by imitating a model. But unlike natural selection, when guided
variation takes place, individuals consciously assess whether a variant they
acquired by imitation is successful or needs to be modified and whether any
modifications they make are successful. Natural selection operates without
individuals engaging in any individual learning. Thus, unlike natural selec-
tion, guided variation requires naive individuals to have criteria to guide
them in their individual learning.57 As long as the criteria guiding individual
learning are adaptive, guided variation will act to push the mean variants
of dispositions in the population toward the optimum. Both natural selection
and guided variation are evolutionary forces (forces that improve fitness
from one generation to the next). But natural selection increases the fre-
quency of successful traits from one generation to the next solely by virtue
of the fact that those randomly acquired behaviors most conducive to indi-
viduals becoming models will be more likely to be imitated by others who
are acquiring their dispositions by randomly imitating models. In contrast,
guided variation increases the frequency of successful traits even if the ini-
tially acquired behavior would not have been conducive to individuals be-
coming models. In guided variation, the increased frequency of successful
traits in succeeding generations results purely from the success of the indi-
vidual learning that leads individuals to modify initially acquired behaviors,
rather than the success of the initially acquired behavior itself.
In the commercial context, guided variation would occur after an individ-
ual had acquired a practice by imitating a successful commercial actor. The
transmission of that commercial practice is influenced by guided variation
when the individual discovers through trial and error or rational calculation
that the practice is inefficient and modifies it in an attempt to improve effi-
ciency. For example, suppose that the automobile dealer above, who
adopted the practice of offering a 5-year warranty on his cars, subsequently
evaluated the successfulness of offering such warranties and modified the
warranty as a result. The cultural transmission of the modified practice,
from that dealer to another, would be subject to the force of guided varia-
tion.
Given that it is typically difficult to isolate the effects of individual com-
mercial practices, and that any one inefficient practice is unlikely to cause
56 Id at 95.
57 Note, however, that all evolutionary forces, including natural selection, require naive
individuals to have criteria to guide them, consciously or not, in identifying models.
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significant overall losses in any single transaction, guided variation is likely
to play a significant role in eliminating only those inefficient commercial
practices whose effects are not only economically significant but also can
be easily determined to have been caused by a particular practice. Guided
variation is therefore likely to act principally as a stopgap force preventing
the evolution of exceedingly and obviously inefficient practices, but it will
not be a strong force either in culling out moderately inefficient practices
or in creating new practices that moderately increase efficiency.
The third force acting on cultural transmission is called "biased trans-
mission. '"" Although some transmission is random,59 the transmission of
culture might be systematically biased. Boyd and Richerson identify three
varieties of potential bias in the transmission of culture. They illustrate with
the example of a naive individual choosing between use of a "pencil grip"
or a "racquet grip" for ping pong in a population with a given distribution
of different models using each type of grip. If the naive individual limits
his choices to those modeled for him, he forgoes acquisition through pure
individual learning. If he then chooses by directly assessing the suitability
of each grip modeled, for example, by practicing with each, the acquisition
of the disposition to use one type of grip rather than the other is "directly
biased." Like guided variation, direct bias requires the use of individual
learning. As long as criteria guiding direct bias are adaptive, direct bias will
always act as a force pushing the mean practice in a population toward the
optimum. But unlike guided variation, which uses individual learning to
modify a practice after its adoption by imitation, direct bias uses individual
learning-in this example, the trial and error procedure-to select the be-
havior to be imitated from among the variations of behavioral dispositions
modeled.' Thus, in directly biased transmission, the genetic predisposition
of naive individuals leads them to restrict the behavioral dispositions they
might adopt to those modeled for them. Although their choice to so restrict
their set of alternatives is not itself subject to rational deliberation, their de-
5 Boyd and Richerson, at 9 (cited in note 23); see generally chs 5-8.
9 We have already seen how random variation is possible in the case of transmission by
imitation (see text accompanying note 55 above). Boyd and Richerson, at 144-45 (cited in
note 23) consider how teaching might contribute to biased transmission but do not consider
how random variation could result from teaching. It is plausible that such random variation
would result from either inadvertent or poor teaching.
0 Thus, unlike guided variation, the force of directly biased transmission is dependent on
the extent of variation among models. Like natural selection, the strength of direct bias is
proportional to the amount of cultural variation. Guided variation, however, can occur even
when only one variation is modeled. If the initially acquired variation is subsequently modi-
fied through individual learning, the mature variation will be modeled for others, rather than
the initial one, and the effects of individual learning will be culturally transmitted.
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cision of which modeled disposition to imitate is subject to rational deliber-
ation.
Directly biased transmission of commercial norms is unlikely to have a
major effect on the evolution of commercial norms. An individual deciding,
for example, what risk-of-loss practice to adopt would look to those risk-
of-loss norms evidenced by the models of successful business people in his
trade. He would then use trial and error or rational calculation to choose
among them. These individual learning methods are likely to be costly and
inaccurate for the same reasons they would be when used in conjunction
with guided variation. Thus, directly biased transmission would act as a
force to prevent the cultural transmission of obviously inefficient practices
but would be unlikely to act as a force refining the efficiency of the evolu-
tion of commercial norms on the margin.
The second type of biased transmission is "frequency-dependent bias."
As in all types of cultural transmission, when the cultural transmission of a
behavioral disposition is subject to the force of frequency-dependent bias,
individuals follow their genetic predisposition to acquire a behavior by imi-
tating the behavior of models. But in frequency-dependent biased transmis-
sion, individuals adopt, consciously or not, the behavior that occurs most
frequently in the model population. If selection were unbiased, the probabil-
ity that individuals would acquire a trait by random imitation of models
would be proportional to the frequency of the trait among models. In this
sense, all selection is frequency-dependent. But Boyd and Richerson use
"frequency-dependent bias" to describe acquisition of a trait when "naive
individuals use the commonness of a variant among their models as an indi-
rect measure of its merit. This will result in an increase in the probability
of acquiring the more common variant relative to unbiased transmission. "61
Returning again to the ping pong example, if an individual chooses a grip
by imitating the one used by the largest number of his models, the transmis-
sion of the grip is subject to frequency-dependent bias. Boyd and Richerson
argue that frequency-dependent bias in favor of acquiring the more frequent
variant, or what they call "conformist transmission," 62 "is adaptive in spa-
6' Boyd and Richerson, at 206 (cited in note 23).
62 Frequency-dependent bias is "conformist" if the tendency to imitate the trait increases
as the trait's frequency increases (id at 205). Boyd and Richerson also distinguish frequency-
dependent bias from direct bias in which the frequency of a given trait is relevant in directly
evaluating its attractiveness. For example, the attractiveness of choosing a career may depend
on how many others have chosen it as well. The crucial difference between "frequency-de-
pendent direct bias" and "frequency-dependent bias" is that "in frequency-dependent bias
the naive individual does not directly evaluate the merit of the variants to which he is ex-
posed; rather he simply uses the frequency of a variant among his models (not the population)
as an indirect measure of its merit" (id at 207).
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tially varying habitats because it provides a simple and generally applicable
rule that increases the chance of acquiring locally adaptive behaviors." 63
If the transmission of commercial norms is subject to frequency-depen-
dent bias, individuals will acquire the variant of a particular practice that is
exhibited by the greatest number of models. Assuming that natural selec-
tion, perhaps together with the effects of guided variation and directly bi-
ased transmission, acts over the course of cultural generations to move the
mean efficiency of the practices of the population of models toward the op-
timum, the variants of practices that occur most frequently in a population
of models will be likely to be more efficient than any other variants mod-
eled. Frequency-dependent bias combines with natural selection acting on
cultural transmission to provide an effective "shortcut" to individual learn-
ing. We have seen that directly biased transmission is not likely to be a
significant force in the cultural transmission of commercial norms because
it requires naive individuals to determine the relative effectiveness of the
behaviors modeled in the population of models. In contrast, frequency-
dependent bias requires naive individuals to determine only the frequency
of a given behavior among a population of models, not its relative effective-
ness. Thus, it is likely to be a significant force leading to the evolution of
efficient commercial norms. Of course, even when the most frequent traits
occurring in models are correlated with success, frequency-dependent bias
is only as reliable as individuals' estimates of which traits have the highest
frequency. For example, it may be difficult to estimate the frequency of
contracting and other commercial practices, especially for new market en-
trants with limited exposure to multiple contracting partners.'
The third type of biased transmission is "indirect bias." "Transmission
is indirectly biased if naive individuals prefer some models over others
based on . .. [one] trait and use such preferences to determine the attrac-
tiveness of that model for other characters (the indirectly biased traits)." 65
63 Id at 223. Like natural selection and direct bias, the force of frequency-dependent bias
increases as the variance of the trait in the population of models increases. Boyd and Richer-
son's other central argument is that frequency-dependent bias can explain "the otherwise
puzzling fact that humans engage in self-sacrificial cooperation in large groups [among genet-
ically unrelated individuals]" (id at 227). They demonstrate how frequency-dependent bias
can provide an explanation for "cultural group selection."
6 However, the contractual inexperience of new market entrants might be reduced through
their use of law firms that have experience drafting contracts in the relevant industry. See
generally Klausner, at 782-84, 786-89 (cited in note 5).
65 Boyd and Richerson, at 243 (cited in note 23). This is an abbreviated version of Boyd
and Richerson's definition of indirectly biased transmission. Their precise definition of indi-
rect bias distinguishes between "three classes of characters": indicator traits, indirectly bi-
ased traits, and preference traits. Indicator traits are characters that "affect the importance
of individuals as models. For example, suppose that naive individuals are more inclined to
imitate successful individuals and that an individual's success is measured by observing a
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To return to the ping pong example, if the naive individual chooses among
the possible grips by imitating the grip used by the most successful ping
pong player, the transmission of the disposition is "indirectly biased." The
model is chosen because he is successful at ping pong. The racquet grip is
chosen because the model uses it. Like natural selection and direct bias, the
strength of indirect bias depends on the amount of variation of the indirectly
biased trait among models.66 Unlike directly biased transmission, no indi-
vidual learning occurs in indirectly biased transmission. The acquisition of
a trait through indirectly biased transmission is neither the result of the na-
ive individual using and testing the trait nor the result of his rational calcu-
lation of the trait's merits; rather, it reflects the naive individual's tendency
to acquire traits simply because they are possessed by a model.
Boyd and Richerson explain that indirect bias has adaptive advantages
over processes like guided variation and direct bias, both of which require
individual learning:
Rather than attempt to determine which variants of each trait lead to success, an
alternative approach is simply to imitate the successful.... If adopting a particular
variant causes individuals to have higher fitness than the average individual, then
it follows that the adaptive variant should occur in higher frequency among individ-
uals with high fitness. Thus, it seems plausible that the strategy of imitating the
successful, a form of indirect bias, might provide an alternative to direct bias, one
that increases an individual's chances of acquiring locally adaptive cultural variants,
is applicable in a wide range of environments, and does not require costly evalua-
tion of the different variants .... Essentially, with indirect bias the individual uses
the lives of others as experiments to evaluate different cultural variants. Because of
this, indirect bias may be much cheaper than direct bias.67
However, although indirect bias typically favors genetically adaptive cul-
tural variations, it may also produce maladaptive cultural variants in much
particular character-number of cows, number of children, or number of publications. We
call this the 'indicator trait.' " Indirectly biased traits are characters whose cultural transmis-
sion is affected by naive individuals' values of the indicator trait. "For example, individuals
might tend to acquire the clothing styles, pronunciation, and beliefs about the world that char-
acterize the most successful individuals among potential models." Preference traits provide
the "criterion by which [naive individuals] determine the values of the indicator trait that
are preferable. In the case of traits such as wealth, the criterion probably would be 'more is
better,' but in other cases there might be some intermediate value that is admired. For exam-
ple, contemporary Americans tend to admire people whose families are of intermediate size,
not the childless or the prolific. We will call this trait the 'preference trait.' " Thus, according
to Boyd and Richerson's definition, "transmission is indirectly biased if naive individuals
prefer some models over others based on an indicator trait and use such preferences to deter-
mine the attractiveness of that model for other characters (the indirectly biased traits)" (id).
66 Id at 254.
67 Id at 258.
EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL NORMS
the same way sexual selection operates in genetic evolution to produce the
phenomena known as genetic drift and the genetic runaway process. The
genetic runaway process, for example, is thought to have produced mal-
adaptive features like the tails on peacocks and birds of paradise. Evolution-
ists conjecture that perhaps exceptional tail length was once correlated with
genetic fitness and therefore natural selection favored peahens predisposed
to prefer males with tails of greater than average length. The female off-
spring of such parents were likely to be predisposed to favor exceptional
tail length and the male offspring would have exceptionally long tails. As
the average length of peacock tails grew, the peahen's predisposition to
seek out mates with tails of above average length led to even longer tails.
Once the tail length exceeded the optimally adaptive length for genetic fit-
ness, natural selection might have selected against larger tails. But by this
point, the entire peahen population was predisposed to mate with peacocks
with longer than average tails. The force of sexual selection was more pow-
erful than that of natural selection, resulting in a genetically maladaptive
tail.68
This same process can take place in cultural evolution. Boyd and Richer-
son illustrate with the cultural practice, on the Micronesian island of Pona-
pae, of associating a man's prestige with the size of yams he contributes to
periodic feasts. The practice cannot be rationalized as encouraging large
and significant contributions to the feasts because other important foods
necessary for the feast are not correlated with prestige. It seems clear that
the practice of growing these yams is genetically maladaptive:
[T]hese yams are truly huge; they sometimes exceed 9 feet in length and 3 feet in
diameter, and up to twelve men must carry them. The yams used by families in
their everyday diet are much smaller. Individual farmers go to great effort to raise
large yams .... [T]he labor expended in growing prize yams is far greater than
would be necessary to produce the same quantity of foodstuff from a larger number
of smaller yams of the same variety." . . . [And] "not infrequently families go
hungry at home when they have large yams in their farms ready for harvest." 6
Boyd and Richerson show how this maladaptive process might have re-
sulted from a cultural runaway process:
' Whether the genetic runaway process leads to a stable, maladaptive equilibrium or even-
tually corrects itself automatically is the subject of current debate. For example, see Andrew
Pomiankowski, The Evolution of Female Mate Preferences for Male Genetic Quality, Oxford
Surveys Evolutionary Biology 5, at 136-84 (1988); Andrew Pomiankowski, Yho Iwasa, and
Sean Nee, The Evolution of Costly Mate Preferences. . Fisher and Biased Mutation, 45 J
Evolution 1422-30 (1991); and Yho Iwasa and Andrew Pomiankowski, Continual Change
in Mate Preferences, 377 Nature 420-22 (1995).
6 Boyd and Richerson, at 269 (cited in note 23) (quoting William Bascom, Ponapae Pres-
tige Economy, 4 Sw J Anthropology 211-21 [19481).
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Suppose that at some earlier time Ponapaens did not devote any special effort to
growing large yams. It seems reasonable that under such conditions more skillful
or industrious farmers might have tended to bring larger yams to feasts, and thus
that the size of a man's yams would provide a useful indicator trait for all kinds of
skills and beliefs associated with farming. By imitating the people who grew large
yams, naive individuals could increase the chance that they would acquire the cul-
tural variants they needed to be successful farmers. Once the size of yams became
an indicator trait, beliefs or practices that lead to larger yams would increase. Indi-
viduals with a stronger tendency to admire large yams will be more likely to acquire
these beliefs. This will cause the two traits to be correlated-and therefore, when
the practices that lead to larger yams increase, so too will the admiration for the
ability to grow large yams.7 °
Indirectly biased transmission might also be a strong evolutionary force
in the cultural inheritance of commercial practices. For example, suppose
that an individual starting out in the automobile manufacturing business be-
lieves that profitability in the business can be measured by the number of
cars sold per year, and that the greater that number is, the greater the com-
pany's profitability is likely to be. Such an individual would then use ex-
isting car manufacturers as his set of models and perhaps identify the one
model with the greatest number of cars s6ld per year. Then the individual
might investigate, for example, whether that manufacturer provides its deal-
ers with the option of ordering particular model cars with specific options
or instead requires them to take a standard array of models with various
options to be delivered at fixed dates throughout the year. If the individual
adopts the model manufacturer's practice of, for example, requiring dealers
to accept standard shipment packages and not accommodating custom or-
ders, solely because it is that manufacturer's practice, that practice would
be described as an indirectly biased trait of the model manufacturer that
the naive individual acquired through indirectly biased transmission. If the
criterion for selecting among models accurately predicts profitability, then
70 Id at 269-70. Notice that indirect bias and the corresponding cultural runaway process
is not strictly analogous to indirect bias in genetic transmission of phenotypes and the corre-
sponding genetic runaway process. The peahen genetic runaway process, for example, re-
quires that there is an initial population of peahens with genetic dispositions to favor greater
than average tail length in their mates and that such tail length is initially correlated with
fitness. The Ponapaean runaway process, however, requires that there be an initial population
of farmers who use, consciously or not, yam size as a criterion of success in selecting models.
Thus, while the. genetic runaway process is based entirely on genetic predispositions, and
requires the postulation only of peahen predispositions for mate selection, the cultural run-
away process, like all processes of cultural transmission, requires that individuals be geneti-
cally predisposed to form beliefs, consciously or not, that guide them in selecting a set of
models from which they will acquire behavioral dispositions. Indirectly biased transmission
then requires that individuals imitate some of the behaviors of their models other than those
that formed the basis for the naive individuals' selection of them as models.
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indirectly biased transmission may be a significant force increasing the ef-
ficient evolution of commercial norms.
In general, since most practices of successful models are likely to be
more efficient than other practices, the strategy of imitating the practices of
a very successful model may prove effective. However, unlike frequency-
dependent bias, there is no assurance that this practice tends to work for all
successful automobile manufacturers. It is possible that the trait is profit-
maximizing only for the model manufacturer, but it would be inefficient for
the naive individual. We might think of such a trait as "idiosyncratic" or
"model specific." For example, perhaps a custom-order procedure is not
cost-effective for large, established manufacturers, but accommodating cus-
tom orders would be cost-effective for a small, start-up manufacturer be-
cause it would enhance sales to reluctant consumers unfamiliar with the
new manufacturer. Moreover, there is no assurance that the model's prac-
tice contributes even to the model's success. While it is unlikely that the
majority of successful models would share a practice that is less efficient
than other modeled practices, it would be less uncommon to find practices
peculiar to a single model that are maladaptive even for that model. Al-
though "nothing succeeds like success," not everything about a successful
model is itself successful.
Despite the dangers inherent in indirectly biased transmission, it might
well be a strong evolutionary force in the cultural transmission of com-
mercial norms. But even if it is, it might also lead on some occasions to
maladaptive runaway processes analogous to the peacock's tail and the
Ponapaens' yam-growing practices. For example, imagine the automobile
industry as a whole is in its infancy, and that instead of measuring a poten-
tial model's success by the number of cars its sells, naive individuals equate
the duration of a company's engine warranty with its profitability. Suppose,
as might seem plausible, that companies making engines that don't last long
will be unable to offer long-lasting warranties at prices competitive with the
price of the equivalent length warranty provided by other companies that
make a more long-lasting engine. In that case, length of warranty might ini-
tially provide a reasonable indicator of a company's current or likely suc-
cess. Naive companies therefore might use this, consciously or not, as a
criterion of success in selecting their set of models. Through indirectly bi-
ased transmission, new car companies therefore begin to imitate the other
business practices of the car company that offers the greater than average
length engine warranty. For example, they might deal with their suppliers,
employees, or dealers (as above) on the same terms that the model car com-
pany deals with its suppliers and employees. There is no assurance, how-
ever, that the practice of providing greater than average length engine -war-
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ranties is, or will remain, correlated with success in the automobile
industry.
Nonetheless, because start-up companies acquire the indirectly biased
traits of the model, like the model's practices in dealing with its suppliers,
employees, and dealers, the start-up companies might also acquire, through
indirect bias, the model's preference for offering greater than average
length engine warranties. If we assume that the other indirectly biased traits
of the model are correlated with success, those start-up companies that ac-
quire those indirectly biased traits are, all else being equal, more likely to
succeed than those that do not. The frequency of the preference for offering
greater than average length warranties among the new generation of suc-
cessful automobile companies will therefore be greater than in the previous
generation. It is possible that successive generations of start-up and success-
ful companies will continue to identify successful, model companies with
the length of their warranties and acquire the other indirectly biased traits
of the model companies as well. As a result, the population of successful
automobile companies may come almost universally to consist in compa-
nies that aspire to offer greater than average length warranty coverage.
Even if the preference for and practice of offering such warranties initially
was profit-maximizing for quality car companies, once the length of war-
ranties passes a certain threshold, such warranties may come to be no longer
cost-effective for the company to offer and consumers to buy. Nonetheless,
if nearly all companies have internalized the norm that greater than average
length warranties are associated with profitability, the practice of competing
by attempting to offer warranties that exceed the length of the current in-
dustry average may continue. Even if the car companies price the warrant-
ies efficiently, they may be requiring consumers to overpurchase warranty
protection in order to buy a car.
To be sure, as in all cases of runaway processes, the counterbalancing
forces of natural selection, guided variation, and direct bias might arrest, if
not reverse, this process. The most obvious corrective in this case is the
market itself, which, in turn, results in natural selection acting on cultural
transmission favoring shorter warranties. If consumers are better-off with
less warranty protection, some consumers who otherwise could have af-
forded a car will not be purchasing cars, and others will be purchasing
lesser quality cars than they would otherwise purchase. Thus, demand for
cars will be inefficiently low in a market in which cars can be purchased
only with lengthy warranties (or perhaps with the option of no warranty at
all). As both consumers and manufacturers come to realize this fact, the
manufacturers have a profit incentive to offer the shorter length warranty to
exploit suppressed demand. If competition starts favoring companies offer-
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ing shorter warranties, and such companies come into existence, then start-
up companies may begin to identify successful models with those that offer
shorter warranties and the cultural transmission process will begin to re-
verse itself away from lengthy warranties.
However, if the practice of offering lengthy warranties continues to be
regarded among successful car manufacturers as an important trait of a suc-
cessful company, the practice may persist in the face of suppressed demand.
Ultimately, the process is likely to be at least arrested by the force of the
market, but the end-state equilibrium of this process may still be one in
which automobile manufacturers only offer warranties that are longer than
would be optimal. The value of offering lengthy warranties would be in-
grained in almost all successful automobile manufacturers and might well
be resistant to market correction. This is likely to be the case if virtually all
manufacturers share the strong preference for lengthy warranties because
there will be little effective competition through which the market process
could correct the practice. In addition, because indirectly biased transmis-
sion is possible only when individuals are predisposed at least initially to
favor social learning over individual learning, manufacturers will often be
disinclined to engage in, or attend to the results of, individual learning.
Thus, guided variation and direct bias may take some time before they add
to the force of natural selection to arrest, if not correct, the runaway war-
ranty process.
C. The Efficient Evolution of Commercial Norms
Natural selection, guided variation, and biased transmission together con-
stitute the forces that transform the system of cultural transmission into an
evolutionary system of cultural inheritance." They explain why a system of
cultural inheritance would typically produce genetically adaptive behavioral
dispositions that could not be produced as effectively by direct genetic
transmission of behavioral dispositions. Dual inheritance theory reconciles
" Among the three versions of biased transmission, directly biased transmission is likely
to lead to the most adaptive dispositions, but it is also likely to be the most costly. Indirect
bias saves the costs of learning attending directly biased transmission, but it is more error-
prone because its success depends on whether (1) the behavioral disposition of the model is
correlated with the model's success and (2) the disposition will be correlated with success
in the naive individual as well. Frequency-dependent bias strikes an apparently reasonable
compromise between costly experimentation and risky sampling. But unlike indirect bias,
there is no directly observed correlation between the behavioral trait and success. Thus, its
effectiveness will depend on whether some force, like guided variation or natural selection,
causes'the majority behavioral variation to be adaptive.
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genetic evolution with a robust system of cultural evolution that enhances
overall genetic fitness. Nonetheless, the cultural norms that result from the
various forces acting on cultural transmission are likely to be far from per-
fectly adaptive. First, in order for the system of cultural transmission to
result from genetic evolution, the norms it produces need only result in
behavioral dispositions that are on average more adaptive than the disposi-
tions individuals would acquire exclusively through individual learning.
Given that individual learning is relatively poor as an exclusive method of
acquiring behavioral dispositions, genetic evolution could produce a system
of cultural inheritance even if cultural transmission produced norms that
were only moderately adaptive on average. Second, as in the case of indi-
rect bias, cultural evolution has autonomous dynamics that can lead to ge-
netically maladaptive cultural variations as well. For these reasons, cultural
norms are likely to fall far short of the optimum. This prediction is further
confirmed by empirical data. There is considerable evidence of the exis-
tence of "cultural inertia," the cultural analogue to phylogenetic inertia.72
As a result of cultural inertia, "cultural traditions ... [do] not change in-
stantly in response to changing environmental conditions. Rather, history
... explain[s] a significant fraction of present behavior and a common past
... cause[s] significant similarities between societies.""
The analysis of the acquisition of commercial practices demonstrates that
they are likely to be culturally transmitted because social learning is likely
to be more cost-effective than individual learning as a general strategy for
acquiring them. Further, the cultural transmission of these practices is al-
most certain to be evolutionary in character, producing norms that increase
in efficiency from one cultural generation to the next. Yet, while these
norms will generally increase in efficiency over time, there is no reason to
believe they will ever, much less always, be optimal. First, the evolution of
72 Boyd and Richerson, at 171 (cited in note 23). Boyd and Richerson rely on social scien-
tific evidence to demonstrate "that many important cultural traits exhibit substantial cultural
inertia in the face of substantial environmental change" (id).
" Id at 56. The existence of cultural inertia supports Boyd and Richerson's argument that
cultural inheritance is a significant component in human evolution. They note that "[i]f the
forces of [direct] bias and guided variation are strong, then there will be little heritable cul-
tural variation and therefore cultural transmission will be of little importance." In order to
support their contention that cultural inheritance is very important in explaining human be-
havior, they point first, as we have seen, to the literature on cognitive error that provides
evidence "that native human decision-making inclinations and abilities, unaided by culturally
inherited problem-solving techniques, are quite modest." Boyd and Richerson, at 171 (cited
in note 23). Their argument is that evidence of cultural inertia is "hard to reconcile with the
action of strong direct bias and guided variation" (id). The fact that changes in human behav-
ior lag considerably behind changes in environment is difficult to explain without positing
strong forces of cultural inheritance.
EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL NORMS
commercial norms will be subject to cultural inertia. Like cultural norms
generally, they will fail to respond promptly and thus optimally to changed
environmental conditions.74 Second, even if all the forces acting on the cul-
tural inheritance of these norms move the mean variant of commercial prac-
tices toward the optimum, the only condition that must be satisfied in order
for natural selection acting on genetic evolution to favor such a system is
that the system produce norms whose average efficiency exceeds the aver-
age efficiency of norms that would result if individuals engaged exclusively
in individual learning. The standard set by a comparison with the latter is
low. Individual learning applied across the board to all acquisitions of com-
mercial practices would be ineffectual. Moreover, the forces acting on the
transmission of commercial norms will be expected sometimes to lead to
quite inefficient practices that are resistant to correction by either natural
selection acting through the market or individual learning as applied in
guided variation or directly biased transmission.
In sum, considerable faith can be placed in the claim that the average
efficiency of the practices identified by commercial norms will increase
over time. In this sense, the analysis provided by the theory of cultural evo-
lution confirms the proposition that commercial norms will evolve effi-
ciently. But this analysis provides no basis for inferring that commercial
practices will be even nearly optimal on average. The only inference that
can be made from the claim that commercial norms evolve efficiently is
that commercial norms on average will identify practices that are suffi-
ciently wealth-maximizing that merchants will be better-off on average fol-
lowing them than relying on individual learning to select all of their com-
mercial practices. Given the high average costs of individual learning,
commercial norms could evolve efficiently even though they identify quite
inefficient practices. Indeed, the theory of cultural evolution suggests that
" The phenomenon of "evolutionary lag" has been integrated into analyses of the evolu-
tion of commercial law, but those analyses fail to take into account the phenomenon of evolu-
tionary lag, or cultural inertia, in nonlegal practices. For example, Goetz and Scott argue that
because state-supplied standard rules of contract "evolve slowly, official rules necessarily
lag behind the emergence of new conditions, resulting in increasingly ill-fitting formulations.
By implying a variety of terms derived from the general commercial environment, the state
expands the supply of widely useful, standard forms of agreement .... These 'customary'
formulations serve as general standards for particular sets of transactions, thus reducing the
error caused by reliance on ill-fitting official formulations" (Goetz and Scott, at 276-77
[cited in note 5] [emphasis added]). Their claim that reliance on informal practices will miti-
gate the inefficiency caused by evolutionary lag in the development of state-supplied contract
terms assumes that the evolution of commercial customs is not itself subject to evolutionary
lag. According to the theory of cultural evolution, this assumption is false. Thus, Goetz and
Scott's strategy of incorporating informal practices as contract terms, apart from its other
merits, is a dubious solution to the problem of evolutionary lag in legal rules.
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there will be some, if only a minority, of commercial practices that are not
merely suboptimal but far more inefficient than the alternative practices that
could have been produced easily by individual learning.
III. OPTIMALITY AND REALITY IN DESIGNING COMMERCIAL LAW
The cultural evolution analysis of commercial norms is significant in its
implications for legal design strategies. The dominant approach to legal de-
sign is provided by the incorporation strategy, yet lawmakers and scholars
regularly attempt to improve on commercial norms by engaging in extended
reasoning and experimentation. The standard economic defense of the in-
corporation strategy, however, presumes that there is little room for im-
provement, and so little point in such attempts.75 The cultural evolution
analysis of commercial norms rebuts that presumption.
The economic defense of the incorporation strategy can be presented as
follows: commercial actors who do not adopt efficient practices will be
competed out of business by those who do. Therefore, once a common
practice develops, contract law should give legal effect to that practice. Do-
ing so will save contracting expenses for the majority of contractors, for
whom the common practice is probably optimal, and will impose on the
minority of contractors, who require different terms, the lesser aggregate
amount of contracting expenses. Assuming that the expenses of contracting
for individuals in the majority and the minority are the same on average,
majoritarian default rules minimize the deadweight loss caused by con-
tracting expenses."
The key premise of this defense of the incorporation strategy is the claim
that common practices of commercial actors are probably optimal. The ar-
gument I have presented challenges this premise. Clearly, most commercial
" Claims for the efficiency of commercial norms are, however, typically made alongside
the weaker claim for the comparative superiority of commercial norms to legal alternatives.
For example, in the tort context, Richard Epstein argues that "[w]hen custom is used, the
courts can, in effect, function in a reactive fashion, relying on the practices formulated by
those who have powerful incentives to get things right because of the daily peril in which
they labor .... The effort to second-guess what a business has done requires a court to look
with deep suspicion on the one source of information with a built-in tendency to reliability
and to substitute its, or a jury's judgment of what is prudent and what is not for the judgment
of those in the field, even though both judge and jury have inferior knowledge and a weaker
incentive to get things right" (The Path to the T. J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Cus-
tom in the Law of Tort, 21 J Legal Stud 1, 24 [1992]).
76 It is possible, however, that an inefficient, minoritarian rule could result in an inefficient
pooling equilibrium. In that case, because the gains to the majority of contracting out of that
rule are exceeded by the transaction costs, the deadweight loss consists in the suboptimal
contract terms in the majority's contracts, rather than the unnecessary transaction costs typi-
cally associated with a minoritarian default rule. See Barry Adler, The Questionable Ascent
of Hadley v Baxendale (unpublished manuscript, 1997).
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actors intend their practices to maximize profit. But the claim that actors
seek to maximize profit cannot suffice to demonstrate that their practices
will be optimal. A rational, profit-maximizing merchant will invest in the
development of more efficient commercial practices until the marginal cost
of such investments equals the marginal gain in expected increased effi-
ciency. Merchants therefore will cease investments in developing more ef-
ficient commercial practices long before they develop optimal practices.
Further increases in efficiency will almost invariably be available, although
the cost to individual merchants of discovering how to achieve those in-
creases will outweigh their benefits. In essence, this is the lesson of the the-
ory of cultural evolution. Given that individual learning is generally less
cost-effective than social learning, merchants who rely on social learning
will be more likely to succeed. But in order for social learning to be gener-
ally more cost-effective than individual learning, the practices they recom-
mend need only be more cost-effective for individual merchants to adopt
than the alternative of adopting commercial practices by investing in indi-
vidual learning. Cost-effective investments in acquiring commercial prac-
tices are unlikely to lead to optimal commercial practices. Optimality is a
luxury that merchants cannot afford.
Of course, a demonstration of the suboptimality of commercial practices
does not by itself prove that alternative legal design strategies can effec-
tively improve on the default rules selected by the incorporation strategy.
At best, establishing that the reality of commercial practice is less than the
theoretical ideal provides a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for seek-
ing alternative design strategies. To argue otherwise is to risk "committing
the Pigouvian fallacy of comparing the real with the ideal." 7 7 Thus, whether
the shortcomings of the incorporation strategy can be improved on by alter-
native legal design strategies will depend not only on whether commercial
practice is likely to be optimal but also on whether more efficient alterna-
tive legal rules can be cost-effectively designed and implemented. A dem-
onstration that designed legal rules can be more efficient than evolved com-
mercial laws cannot suffice to demonstrate that a practical institutional
system can be created to insure the production and implementation of effi-
cient default rules by alternative design strategies. Notwithstanding the fact
that there are good reasons to believe that legal design can in principle pro-
duce more efficient rules than the evolutionary process producing commer-
" Robert E. Scott, at 336 (cited in note 44). The distinction between the real and the ideal
also emphasizes the importance of taking transition costs into account. Even if a theoretically
possible regime is superior to an existing one, given the reality of expected transition costs,
it may be that the current system is optimal in the sense that no superior alternative is cost-
effective given transition costs.
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cial practice,78 public choice,79 psychological," and informational problems
present potentially serious obstacles to creating a system in which the con-
tent of commercial law is sometimes given by design, rather than by evolu-
tion. Moreover, the same forces affecting the evolution of commercial
norms will affect the evolution of norms governing any potential process
that attempts to improve on commercial norms. Although these norms are
not themselves commercial norms, they may also impede attempts to im-
prove on commercial practice. To make the positive case for supplementing
the incorporation strategy with alternative legal design strategies, more
must be done than demonstrating that these practices leave room for im-
provement. By doing the latter, however, I hope to have provided reason to
undertake the former.
"As economically oriented contractualists are apt to put it, 'government,' in the person
of judges, legislators, or regulators, is only infrequently likely to do better than [contractual
partners] on either the incentive or the information dimension. Government regulation is
therefore quite unlikely to make [the contracting parties'] contract better for [the contracting
parties]. Government's role is to produce public goods and deal with negative externalities.
Regulation of contractual relationships is therefore justified only when they have adverse ef-
fects on third parties" (Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of
Corporate Law, 89 Colum L Rev 1703, 1714-15 [1989]). Along the same lines, James White
argues that because business practice often ignores or contradicts legal rules, "lawmakers
must be more willing to make the law conform to the sensible practices of business and to
accept the fact that the law is incapable of changing those practices except at great cost"
(James J. White, Contract Law in Modern Commercial Transactions, an Artifact of Twentieth
Century Business Life, 22 Washburn L J 1 [1982]). But see Posner (cited in note 5) (arguing
that the state can and has effectively identified and transformed inefficient social norms).
" See, for example, Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U Pa L Rev 595 (1995) (arguing that the American Law Institute and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law are subject to standard public
choice problems that lead to bias in the substance and form of legal rules they promulgate).
" It is possible that substituting a more efficient default rule for a less efficient one that
is based on common commercial practice might be futile. Alan Schwartz argues that default
rules that seek to change common practice should be thought of as "problem-solving" de-
faults. He claims they "must solve a problem that a reasonable portion of contractors will
face in a way that is acceptable to those contractors. A rule that fails the former aspect of
this test is wasted effort; a rule that fails the latter aspect will not survive in the marketplace"
(Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 390 S Cal Inter-
disciplinary L J 389, 392 [1993]). Thus, even if lawmakers replace a default rule based on
commercial practice with an improved default rule, merchants might be sufficiently deferen-
tial to the norm that they will contract around the more efficient default rule to use the less
efficient one recommended by the norm. Unless the psychological disposition to follow the
norm is overcome, commercial parties might continue their less efficient practices, opting out
of the alternative default rule whose efficiency they will fail to appreciate. See also, Alan
Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and
Judicial Strategies, 21 J Legal Stud 271, 277 (1992) ("courts that pursue transcendent fair-
ness will sometimes supply parties with inefficient terms. This often will be wasted effort
because typical parties have an incentive to contract out"). But Schwartz also notes that
"[t]he effort would not be wasted if fair terms were mandatory" (Schwartz, Relational Con-
tracts, at 277 n 1l).
EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL NORMS
IV. CONCLUSION
If the incorporation strategy can be relied on to produce nearly optimal
commercial rules, there is little point in debating even the relative merits of
alternative rules, much less the feasibility of creating legal institutions that
will effectively implement a system for designing those alternatives. Be-
cause innovation is costly, the wisdom of seeking viable altemative legal
design strategies to supplement the incorporation strategy depends entirely
on demonstrating that common commercial practice on average will leave
considerable room for improvement: if the incorporation strategy ain't
broke, don't fix it. In this article, I have argued that although the incorpora-
tion strategy is the best available method for creating a complete system of
contract default rules, the practices it incorporates are likely nonetheless to
be significantly suboptimal. This suggests that if alternative, cost-effective
methods of legal design can be devised and implemented to improve on
individual commercial practices, significant efficiency gains might be
achieved. Although legal design is fraught with problems, the analysis in
this article suggests that the search for solutions to those problems may well
be worth the candle.
